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RESERVATION LANDS
Daniel W. Overton
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Lincoln, NE 68502

Abstract. In 1883 the U.S. General Land Office conducted the sale ofthe eastern
remnant ofthe BigBlue reservation in Nebraska and Kansas for the benefit ofits
owners, the Otoe-Missouria Indians. The property soldfor an average of$I2.22
an acre. It was the highest per-acre price ever offered for Indian lands on the
Central and Northern Great Plains. Before the first year ofwhite settlement had
come to an end, however, many landholders began to petition federal authorities
for payment-time extensions and, eventually, debt reductions. They argued that
they had been "forced" to pay more for their lands than what they were actually
worth. In the end, after nearly two decades ofwell-organized white agitation, the
politically disadvantaged Otoe-Missourias were compelled to accept an "adjustment"on the outstandingdebts due them. This amounted to a loss to the Indians
ofapproximately $169,000.
Were the settlers justified in their demands for price reductions? More
specifically, were the various contentions that they had based their collective
argument on truly valid? This paper will discuss these and other secondarily
related questions by means ofan inspection ofthe written historical record, as
well as by a quantitative and qualitative analysis ofland valuation and ownership data contained in the county deed records.
Indian Dispossession

A popular view among many Americans today holds that the aboriginal
homelands of the collective Indian peoples were acquired by the United
States government through military conquest and unmitigated deceit. This
is (for the most part, at least) a misconception. Actually-as averred by
President Truman upon signing the Indian Claims Commission Act into law
on August 13, 1946--0ver ninety percent ofthe public domain was purchased
from the various native tribes and nations at a conjectured cost to the
government ofsome 800 million dollars (Cohen 1960:304). Ifwe assume that
this figure is reasonably accurate (which is briefly questioned below), the
263

264

Great Plains Research Vol. 2 No.2, 1992

obvious question then becomes: Was it a fair price? This is, of course, a
difficult and debatable question requiring much greater inspection than can
be allowed here. Nevertheless, it could be. noted that given the fact that such
payments were made not to one generation, but, indeed, to several past
generations of Indian peoples, and given that the cessions in question
(neglecting Alaska and Hawaii) amounted to some 3,027,000 square miles, it
would not be too impolitic to conclude off the top of one's head that the
Indians had probably been undercompensated-ifnot actually robbed at gun
point.
As to the accuracy of the 800 million dollar figure, in the long list of
grievances that came to be aired before the Indian Claims Commission, the
issue of whether or not a given Indian society had actually received the
payments due them was one that rarely went unquestioned in court. In order
to address any conflicting claims it was necessary to provide as complete an
accounting ofthe sums paid out to the Indians as possible. The data contained
in such investigations, however, could also be seen as providing the basis for
a new twist on the question of compensation, namely: How much of the 800
million dollars actually went into Indian pockets (or stomaChS)? An inspection of the Otoe-Missouria case, for instance, indicates that a considerable
proportion ofOtoe-Missouria trust fund monies were directed, at the discretion of their federal guardian, towards what might arguably be construed as
"non-Indian" expenses; that is, white employee salaries (farmers, laborers,
wagoners, blacksmiths, teachers, etc.), white employee housing and home
furnishings, and so forth (General Accounting Office 1950). This is an issue
that, being readily quantifiable, deserves further detailed research.
On one point, at least, the historical record (particularly in regard to the
latter half of the nineteenth century) is hardly debatable: that Indian health
and well-being deteriorated rapidly and in direct proportion to the level of
their landed dispossession. One need only make a summary examination of
the annual reports of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs to reach this
conclusion. Further illustration of the point may be derived from the steep
decline in American Indian population numbers, which went from an estimated pre-contact figure of 800,000 to 2,000,000, to a scant 237,000 by 1900
(Prucha 1984:404).
There were many other factors, besides the loss onand, that contributed
to Indian impoverishment. But the fact that Indian societies typically
received grossly inadequate payment for their ceded properties is certainly
one of the more significant components. What is more, payment is one
consideration that can be objectively determined. From his analysis oflndian
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Claims Commission case data, for instance, David Wishart concluded that, on
average, Indian societies of the Central and Northern Great Plains received
a "niggardly" ten cents per acre for the cession of some 290 million acres of
land (Wishart 1990:97).
It is against this larger backdrop of"undercompensation as a norm" that
this paper addresses the specific historical event of the sale (and its political
aftermath) of the Otoe-Missourias' last remaining tract of native homeland
on the Central Great Plains.
A Legacy of Otoe-Missouria Cessions
Over a short period of time, from 1830 to 1854, the Otoe-Missourias
ceded some 4,677,800 acres of tribal land to the United States government,
for which they received a total of $573,367 in annuities, goods, and servicesor about twelve cents an acre. Such were the findings of the Indian Claims
Commission a century or so after the fact. In its amended decision of 1964,
the Commission awarded a later generation of Otoe-Missourias a total of
$2,929,076 in compensation for the "unconscionable" and "unfair" payments
their forebears had received during this early period (Otoe and Missouria
Tribes ofIndians v. United States, 2 Indian Claims Commission 1953:507; 13
Indian Claims Commission 1953:218).
Following the Treaty of 1854, the Otoe-Missourias moved from their
lands below the Platte River in eastern Nebraska to the 1O-by-25-mile
rectangle of homeland that had been set aside for them. Their new reservation was situated along the present-day Kansas-Nebraska border approximately sixty miles west of the Missouri River. It was a particularly choice tract
of tall-grass prairie interspersed, along the courses of the Big Blue River and
its laterally branching tributaries, with well-timbered fluvial bottom lands.
Government surveyors in 1875 described the reservation's soils as being
"considerably above the average of the lands in this section of the State" (U.S.
General Land Office 1875). In the westward rush that followed the Homestead, Pacific Railroad, and Agricultural College Acts of 1862, the lands
surrounding the Otoe-Missouria reservation were quickly taken up by largescale investors, pettyspeculators, and, bringing up the rear, bona fide settlers.
By 1870 "free" homestead lands in Gage County, Nebraska and Marshall
County, Kansas no longer existed. For recent or late arrivals, the only lands
in the region that remained unclaimed (by Euro-Americans) happened to be
those that were "lying idle" in the Big Blue reserve. The Indians would have
togo.
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Compelled by poverty, illness, internal political discord, and the rising
agitation of neighboring whites clamoring for their removal, the OtoeMissourias reluctantly agreed in 1876 to sell 120,000 acres offthewesternside
of their reserve. The tract sold for an average of $3.85 an acre. The new
owners, however, were in no hurry to pay for their lands (nor was the federal
government particularly adamant in its insistence that they do so), and the
monies that were finally realized came much too late to prevent or forestall
the Otoe-Missourias' abandonment of their last remaining parcel of native
homeland: the 42,000 acre Eastern Remnant of the Big Blue Reservation
(Fig. 1). In 1881 they placed the sale of this tract in government hands and
migrated to the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) (Chapman 1965; Overton
1991).
Sale of the Eastern Remnant

By the time the eastern remnant was opened to settlement in 1883, a
record-breaking boom in private land sales was reaching its apex in the now
fully settled region ofeastern Kansas-Nebraska (Sheldon 1936). Legislation
providing for the sale oftheeastern remnant specified that it would be opened
to "actual settlers only" and in limited quantities not to exceed 160 acres per
entryman. The lands would be sold for "no less" than their appraised values,
these to be determined by a three-man government commission (one of
whose members was to be appointed by the Indians). Qualified settlers were
given the option of making deferred payments: one quarter down with three
years to complete payment ofthe principal plus 5% interest per year. Because
the demand for these fertile lands had become so intense, government
officials decided at the last minute to dispose of them through public sale to
the highest bidder rather than by private entry, as had been the case in the sale
of the western portion. This was highly unusual; in fact, never before in
American history had ceded Indian lands been offered in limited quantities
to actual settlers only by means of public auction (Overton 1991).
Appraisal of the eastern remnant, in forty-acre parcels, was completed
in Februaryofl883. The estimated prices averaged $6.08 an acre, with a range
of $2.50 to $12.00 per acre. But did these figures accurately reflect the true
market value of eastern remnant lands at that time? Or were the appraisals
actually lower than would have been the case for comparable private, or nonIndian, lands? These would soon become important questions, and they are
central to the theme of this study.
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Eastern Remnant
of the
Otoe-Missouria Reservation
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Big Blue River
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Figure 1. Eastern Remnant of Otoe-Missouria Reservation.

Eastern remnant sales commenced on May 31, 1883. The auction was
held on Court Street in the booming farming community of Beatrice, Nebraska. The Commissioner ofthe U.S. General Land Office, Noah McFarland,
was on hand to see to it that things ran smoothly (perhaps he had a
premonition that they would not). The long-awaited opening gavel was
attended by more than four thousand interested parties, considerably outnumbering the 1,060 forty-acre parcels available to them. Many had journeyed in from neighboring states-some from as far away as New England.
Biddingwas spirited, at times "wild and reckless," and by the end ofthesecond
day a smattering of unclaimed parcels was all that remained.
But there was a flaw in the payment process that stemmed from the
"actual settler only" stipulation. Successful bidders would need time to
complete the involved process of providing proof of settlement. Such proof
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consisted of an applicant's affidavit claiming permanent residence, together
with the affidavits of two disinterested parties. Since it was not reasonable to
expect a purchaser to provide the necessary one-quarter down payment
before he was able to prove that he was indeed a bona fide settler, Congress
granted a grace period of three months in which to furnish both. It was an
allowance that led inevitably to incidents of intentional delay and outright
fraud (Otoe Land Ring 1883; Chapman 1965; Overton 1991).
By early September nearly half of the purchases were in default. Several
debtors had zealously over bid more than they could afford (or cared, on
second thought) to pay. While others had placed false, or "straw," bids as a
means of forcing a more favorable resale of defaulted parcels. Their plan
backfired. Commissioner McFarland instructed Beatrice land office employees to "accept no bid from parties in default" at the December 11 resale of
reverted parcels. To avoid a repeat of earlier abuses, the three month grace
period was canceled; successful bidders would have to make their down
payments on the day of the sale (McFarland 1884:2).
Although the winter resale was attended by fewer buyers, the bidding
resumed with comparable alacrity and was soon over. Final purchase prices
for the sale and resale ofeastern remnant lands averaged out to $12.22 an acre,
with a range of$3.12 to $57.31 per acre (U.S. Senate 1888). Many ofthese new
landowners resented the fact that they had been "forced" to compete for the
privilege of paying top dollar for "wild and uncultivated" Otoe-Missouria
lands. And as Berlin Chapman has observed, the mood ofthese white citizens
must have darkened considerably upon learning a few years later, in 1889, that
two million acres of Creek and Seminole lands in the Indian Territory were
being given away for the price of an entry fee (Chapman 1965:161).
In their case before the Indian Claims Commission, theOtoe-Missourias
contended, regarding the sales of the western portion and eastern remnant,
that the federal government had implemented specific land disposal policies
which, rather than benefiting the Indians, favored the interests of small-time
white settlers. By disallowing the participation of large-scale investors,
absentee purChasers, or wealthy local farmers who wished to expand their
holdings, these federal policies had served to hamper competition, thereby
artificially deflating final purchase prices. The Commission concluded,
however, that regardless of the effect of the government's policies, the prices
fetched at the 1877 and 1883 sales had not been "unconscionably" low. The
Otoe-Missourias' pleas in these regards were accordingly dismissed (2 Indian
Claims Commission 1953:366).
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Delaying Payment
Under the terms of the Act of 1881, providing for the sale of eastern
remnant lands, purchasers were to have completed their deferred payments
in either August (summer sale) or December (winter resale) of1886. Not one
purchaser managed to do so. Within months of the original sales, in fact,
disgruntled buyers were already pressing Congress and the Interior Secretary
for additional time. Many had invested all oftheir life savings just to meet the
down payment, it was averred, and the costs of breaking sod and building
farms exceeded most annual incomes. They pointed to low commodity prices,
drought, flood, insects, hog cholera, and other misfortunes (Barneston Notes
1886; U.S. House of Representatives 1886:1). Congress responded generously with two two-year extensions: one in 1885 and another in 1886.
Completed payments would not be due now until 1890. Even so, by the time
that deadline had come and gone, fewer than two-fifths-126 out of 323
original entrymen-had met their purchase obligations.
After 1890 completed payments dwindled to a bare trickle. General
Land Office officials, however, seemed either disinterested, or quite willing
to stand aside and let the politicians deal with the mess. In March of 1890,
Congress received a petition bearing the signatures of 128 eastern remnant
residents (30 of whom happened to be second buyers) (Chapman 1965:160).
It declaimed that the 1881 act had made no specific mention of a pUblic
auction. This was true; however, the wording of the act did at least imply
competitive bidding, and it was within the discretionary power of the Secretary of the Interior to determine the particular method of disposal, if not
otherwise specified by Congress. The petition also contended that honest
settlers had been "forced" to pay more for their lands than what they were
"actuallyworth" because "a wicked and illegal" conspiracy had corrupted the
May and December sales by driving up prices to unreasonable heights. It is
tempting, of course, to wonder how many of the signatories had themselves
been members of this "land ring." Unfortunately, the written historical
record on this account-regarding specific individuals (other than alleged
ring leaders)-is understandably faint. Newspaper accounts and government
investigations of the period, however, leave little doubt that a conspiracy of
some sort had existed (Otoe Land Ring 1883; McFarland 1884; Nebraska
Conspirators Indicted 1884; Otoe Land Frauds 1884; Defrauding the Indians
1884). Quantitative evidence of the conspiracy, though less direct, can
arguably be derived from the pertinent Gage and Marshall County deed
books (Gage County 1883-1901; Marshall County 1883-1901). While such
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information does not necessarily point a decisive finger at individual culprits,
it does indicate a rather suspicious pattern.
The Otoe Land Ring

In the months following the December resale, complaints and affidavits
from firsthand witnesses began piling up on Secretary of the Interior Henry
Teller's desk accusing certain land office employees ofhaving gone along with
a scheme to privately reduce the public bids of conspiracy ring members. A
special investigator was dispatched to Beatrice to audit land office books and
take statements. His reports were startling enough to prompt Commissioner
McFarland to call for a grand jury investigation (McFarland 1884). On
December 4, 1884, the District Court of Nebraska indicted four Gage County
residents on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States government;
they were: N. K. Griggs, attorney, former U.S. consul to Germany, and onetime President of the Nebraska legislature; W. H. Ashby, attorney, newspaperman, and former Republican delegate; H. W. Parker, Receiver of the
Beatrice land office; and L. E. Wheeler, government auctioneer at the winter
resale. In a trial in the following year Ashby and Wheeler were found innocent
of the major charge of fraud. Both, however, received guilty sentences for
attempting to "hinder the sale" of U.S. property-a minor offense carrying
a fine of $300. At the behest of U.S. Attorney General Augustus Garlandwho had been repeatedly and insistently lobbied by Nebraska and Kansas
Congressmen to intervene-the cases against Parker and Griggs never came
to trial (U.S. District Court Notes 1885; Chapman 1965:152-54 ).
The aim of the conspiracy, which reportedly involved some 75 to 100
individuals, was to secure for its members particular tracts of land, cheaply,
and by whatever means practicable. At the original summer sale the general
plan had been to freeze out non-local competition and force a resale by
placing straw bids on chosen tracts. Since it is unlikely that many of the
"outsiders" who had been chased from the field at the summer auction would
have cared to return that winter for more of the same, the scheme probably
met with some success. But the conspirators did not get the private resale they
had hoped for (many had imagined that the government would not want to go
to the bother of staging another auction). And, as previously noted, those
parties who succeeded in placing straw bids at the summer sale managed only
to find themselves barred from participating at the re-offering.
At the winter auction it was pointless to place straw bids because the
one-quarter down payment was now due on the day of the sale. It was,
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Figure 2. 1883 Sales of the Eastern Remnant.

however, possible to confound the sale, and hence the competition, by placing
"side bids" on parcels that had been "reserved" by ring members. By failing
to make an appearance for a particular purchase, side bidders (who did not
necessarily need to be interested purchasers) could stall the proceedings,
even if only for a few hours, and thereby force a re-offering-hopefully to a
reduced field of buyers (Overton 1991:112-17).
The map of 1883 Sales of the Eastern Remnant (Fig. 2) plots price and
land entry data contained in county deed books. The classification, percent
increase of purchase price over appraised price, is used to give a rough
indication of how dearly each forty-acre parcel was acquired in relation to all
others. The method used here of determining class divisions is a subjective
one based upon logical breaks in the data. It is noted that the data become
highly skewed towards the more expensive price class. Many of the most
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expensive parcels comprise the townsite, and vicinity, ofBarneston, Nebraska
(the town was platted in 1884 by H. L. Ewing; the land had cost him $57.31 an
acre at the winter resale; at the summer sale the property had brought $118
an acre, but was defaulted upon).
A quantitative interpretation of the map indicates that the best bargains-those in which the fetched prices most closely approximate their
appraised values-were considerably more numerous at thewinter resale (83
percent of the of the lower, or cheaper, price class was taken in December).
The most expensive parcels, on the other hand, were largely taken at the
summer sale (62 percent ofthe higher price class was taken in May). Notable
exceptions to this latter trend include the fiercely-contested Barneston
parcels, and a number of choice Big Blue River bottom land parcels in the
Kansas portion of the reserve that had been grossly under-appraised and, for
some reason, defaulted upon after the May sale.
Interestingly, out of a total of 1,060 forty-acre parcels available for
purChase, only 27 had purchase prices that exactly equalled their appraisal
prices; and of those, 25 were secured at the winter resale. According to deed
records, four of these ultimate bargain parcels went to none other than L. E.
Wheeler, the government auctioneer. He purchased his 160 acres at the
winter resale for the original appraisal price of six dollars an acre. A few
months later Wheeler sold the property for $15 an acre.
Clearly there were more bargains available at the winter resale. In fact,
winter resale prices averaged approximately one-and-a-half dollars per acre
less than summer sale prices. Of course these facts conflict with the paymentwithholders' contention that the conspiracy had had the effect of driving
prices up. Actually, as already noted, the intent ofthe conspiracy had been to
drive competition away from "reserved" tracts by temporarily bidding in
whatever price was necessary-not to force buyers in general to pay more.
Those parcels that were purposely driven up at the summer sale were largely
defaulted upon and re-offered at the winter resale-at which, competition
was diluted by the effects of illegal activities at both sales. Thus, if there had
indeed been a conspiracy, and if it had indeed influenced the events at the
1883 sales, one would expect average prices to be significantly lower at the
winter resale, which they were.
The Quest for Price Reductions
By 1895 delinquent purchasers had managed to evade payment on lands
which, technically speaking, had lapsed into forfeiture five years previously.
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Such disregard would never have been tolerated (no matter how sad the
excuses) if these had been state school lands, or privately owned lands. But
the lands being defaulted upon in this instance were government-held Indian
lands, and the profits being withheld belonged to a removed group of native
non-citizens.
In July, 1895, Secretary of the Interior Hoke Smith-who believed that
the defaulting purchasers were unwilling, not unable, to pay-took the bold
initiative of dispatching notices to defaulters informing them that they had
ninety days to pay up or vacate the premises. Before the three months had
expired, however, he was obliged to withdraw the directive, retreating under
the intense political debate it had ignited (Chapman 1965:170-72). An agent
of the Interior Department was sent to the scene a month later. His report
indicated that the settlers were unable to make payments becauseofthe losses
endured through two years ofsevere drough t. He noted as well, however, that
all of the lands were presently under cultivation, and that the defaulting
purchasers had spent "comparatively large sums" on improving their farmswhich, he estimated, had appreciated in value to an average $15 to $30 per
acre (U.S. Senate 1899:5).
Throughout the 1890's, populist Congressmen, such as Algernon S.
Paddock of Nebraska, introduced a series of bills aimed at reducing the
outstanding debts of "these poor settlers." But Otoe-Missouria consent was
a prerequisite to any "agreed-upon" course of action (unless, of course, the
government wished to absorb the cost ofa settlement-which it did not). The
Otoe-Missourias, however, were in no mood to help a society ofwhite settlers
who, as they saw it, had thought nothing of hounding them from their last
remaining tract of native soil.
In addition to arguing that an illegal combination had driven up their
debt loads beyond a sufferable height, delinquent purchasers accused the
General Land Office of actual deception. It was claimed that Commissioner
McFarland, a seasoned land office man, had been inordinately concerned by
the steepness of the bidding in 1883. So much so, in fact, that he supposedly
advised "honest settlers" to go ahead and bid whatever price necessary to
secure their parcels; he would, it was avowed, see to it that their bids were, at
some later date, adjusted to approximate the appraised value of the lands
(U.S. House of Representatives 1899:5). McFarland denied absolutely that
he had ever made any such promises (U.S. House of Representatives
1900:3428). Nevertheless, with repeated telling, the accusation seemed to
generate a will and rationale ofits own. Standing at a historical distance, what
seems perfectly bewildering is that so few Congressmen saw reason to decry
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the inherent illogicalness of the story. What, after all, could have been the
point of having an auction if competitive bidding was not going to be
accepted? Why not just draw names out of a hat? And besides, there were
literally thousands of people attending the auctions-how could McFarland
have made out who the "honest" settlers were, and of those, which ones were
most genuine and needy of his patronage?
In the end, the Otoe-Missourias had little choice, given their lack of
political support, but to succumb to the pressure for a compromise. By the
provisions of the Act of 1900, delinquent purchasers were allowed to pay an
"adjusted" price equal to 25% above the appraised base (the original price
had averaged about 100% above the base), plus seventeen years "adjusted"
interest. By 1900 the interest due on most accounts came close to equalling
the principal (Chapman 1965:192). It is important to note, however, that
these lands had presumably been earning income over the interim, and
untaxed income at that, since the unpaid title was still held by the government.
By present-day standards, the Act of 1900 could easily be regarded as
being a study in inequity. It took from a tribe of Indians-who, at the time,
were living in dire poverty (U.S. Department of the Interior 1883-1900)monies to which they had been morally and legally entitled, and awarded it to
individuals who typically did not even own title rights to the lands they were
being compensated for. Approximately three out of every five adjustment
beneficiaries had alreadysold their unpaid properties by 1900. In fact, one out
of every five had done so by the close of 1886. Thus, well more than half of
those individuals who benefitted by the act were actually second (if not third
and fourth) buyers. Had they too been forced to pay more for their lands than
what they were worth? Original entrymen who had already met their
purchase obligations prior to the act's passage, on the other hand, received
nothing, despite the fact that they had, on average, bid roughly the same for
their lands as their recalcitrant neighbors had (Overton 1991:157-62).
Too Much to Pay?
In their campaign to win debt reductions, delinquent purchasers rallied
around claims that: 1) the government had been out of line in offering the
Otoe-Missouria lands by public auction; 2) the May and December sales had
been corrupted by an illegal conspiracy that had had the effect of increasing
prices; and 3) Commissioner McFarland had promised settlers a reduction on
their purchase obligations, which he subsequently failed to honor. The
combined effect of these abuses, it was alleged, had been to compel settlers to
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Figure 3. Eastern Remnant Land Resales.

pay more for their lands than what they were actually worth. This belief, or
contention, lies at the very heart of the matter. Were the original purchase
prices, in fact, unreasonable or unfair?
A quantitative analysis of the Land Resales map (Fig. 3) indicates that
more than 20% of all eastern remnant \'larcels were resold within three years
of the May and December sales. It is safe to assume that the great majority
of these parcels had been acquired for strictly speculative, rather than
settlement, purposes, and also that they had not been significantly improved
over the short period in which they were initially held. By 1890, despite (or
perhaps because of) high crop yields and favorable growing conditions over
the intervening period, nearly 43% of the entire tract had passed into the
hands of secondary purchasers. Resales tapered off significantly after 1890,
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in direct proportion to the dwindling number of completed payments received during the period. By the close of1901, the total resold area had inched
up to 64%. And so, by the time the Otoe-Missourias finally received
completed, adjusted, payments for their lands, most ofthe original buyers had
either died, or otherwise moved on.
How are we to account for these resales? Did the majority ofsellers give
up their lands because, as many of them claimed, they had had to pay more for
their lands than what they were worth at the time of the 1883 sales? An
examination of average resale prices tends to refute such a conclusion. The
Resale Prices graph (Fig. 4) shows that, on average, original entrymen earned
rather respectable profits on their agricultural investments (especially as, in
addition to resale profits, they had assumably been making a living off their
lands' resources). Average resale prices climbed steadily between the years
1883 and 1901. The Purchase line gives an indication of what the average
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original purchase price had been on lands that were resold in a given year. It
shows that therewas a moderate trend to sell less expensive parcels first, while
holding offon the resale ofthe more expensive properties. More importantly,
however, it shows that in no year did average resale prices fall below-or even
come close to falling below-their corresponding average purchase prices.
The Hinman line refers to a collateral study of aggregate resale prices
for a select group of Nebraska counties. Eleanor Hinman's compact and
monumental work, "History of Farm Prices in Eleven Nebraska Counties,
1873-1933," is an extremely valuable source of information (Hinman 1934).
The study tabulates all warranty deed transfers (Le., sales ofprivate property)
for each of the select counties, and for each year of the study period. The
portion of the Hinman study of interest to this article is confined to the
southeastern group of counties: Clay, York, Fillmore, Saline, Otoe, Seward,
and Polk. With the exception of Otoe County, each of the Hinman counties
is located to the west of Gage County. Thus they are comprised oflands that
were originally settled within the same or a later period as those lands
immediately surrounding the Big Blue reserve. Furthermore, the Hinman
counties are comprised of lands that are of comparable or lesser agricultural
worth to the eastern remnant lands, which lie in a less marginal climactic zone
than those drier counties to the west. Hinman found that for the southeastern
group of counties taken as a whole, warranty sale (Le., resale) prices in 1883
averaged $12.76 an acre. If this amount is adjusted to account for improvements-lO% being a commonly accepted deduction (Le Duc 1953:80)-the
price would average $11.48 an acre. This figure is quite comparable to the
$12.22 average purchase price for eastern remnant lands. This conclusion is
reinforced by the fact that the overall trend lines for Hinman and eastern
remnant resales are remarkably similar. The oft-repeated complaint of
delinquent settlers, that they had been forced into paying more for their lands
than what they were truly worth, is at striking odds with the actual landassessment record.
Conclusion
Not only was the average original bid placed on eastern remnant lands
a fair and reasonable one for the place and time, but, at $12.22 an acre, it stood
as the highest per-acre price ever "promised" to a tribe or nation of Native
Americans on the Northern and Central Great Plains (Wishart 1990:98). It
should come as no surprise, therefore, that a society that had consistently
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devalued Indian property (as well as the Indians' right to hold such property),
could hardly be expected to allow this new sales record to pass unscathed.
By the terms of the Act of 1900, the Otoe-Missourias were required to
forgive $168,784 of the $288,538 in principle and interest still owed them at
the time of the agreement (2 Ind. Cl. Comm. 368 (1978». Not counting
interest, the delinquent purchasers managed to save, on average, a little more
than four dollars an acre on lands that, by 1900, had appreciated to well over
forty dollars an acre.
In their seventh "cause ofaction" before the Indian Claims Commission
in 1953, the Otoe-Missourias argued that once again the federal government
had failed in its duty to protect the financial best interests of its politically
dependent Indian wards. They asserted that the agreement to reduce the outstanding debts of delinquent purchasers had only been acquired through the
tribe's sufferance oftwo decades of unremitting duress. The issue, as they saw
it, was one of principle, of simple fairness.
The Commission, however, decided against the Otoe-Missourias' plea
for compensation on the grounds that they had failed to establish, to the
satisfaction ofthe court, that their forebears' acceptance ofprice adjustments
on unpaid eastern remnant lands had come about as a consequence of"fraud"
or outright "coercion." In rather simplistic terms the Commission found
that:
while it is argued by the plaintiff that the reason for difficulty in
"getting the money" was the political influence of the settlers who
wanted the rebate, and not because the land involved was not worth
the full balance due, the question as to whether or not to make this
rebate and get this balance immediately was a practical one. The
Indians, doubtless, came to the conclusion that they would prefer
to get "the bird in hand" rather than to try for the "two in the bush"
(2 Indian Claims Commission 1953:372).
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